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ABSTRACT 
 
Young people generally form the future of any nation state and Singapore is no 
exception, it is, however, especially concerned about the future of itself as a 
nation. For Singapore the theme of youth is doubled, as the newness of the nation 
is a mirrored reflection of young Singaporeans and for the state. Young people 
embody the fragility of the nation itself, and government policy towards them has 
become a site where anxiety about the future of the nation is expressed. 
"Singaporean youths must have wings and yet know where their nest is" 
interrogates selected policies directed at young people in the city-state of 
Singapore against the backdrop of the youth of that nation-state itself. This 
examination includes: policies towards young offenders (and criminality 
generally), highlighting the anxiety the state feels about the non-conformity of 
young law-breakers and about the othering of criminals, about the role of 
National Service as a mechanism for masculinised nation building, and about the 
definition and discourse around post-independence generations, including the 
"brain drain" generation, the "Generation Millennium", and the "quitters and 
stayers", illustrating Singaporean tension between nationalism and political 
apathy. The resulting analysis questions the notion of youth as agents of change, 
troubles ideas of technology as a mechanism for liberalisation in Singapore, and 
challenges Western assumptions about the liberalising power of affluence and 
globalisation. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Novelty and youth are leitmotivs in the national narrative of Singapore. In 
particular, the government regularly draws attention to the newness of the 
nation in order to stress Singapore's fragility as a nation-state and 
apprehension about the lack of a nationally binding tradition. The nation is 
perceived as being inherently vulnerable to both internal and external 
threats, precisely because of its young people. According to official policies, 
the youth of the nation must, therefore, be disciplined. In this discourse, 
however, "the youth of the nation" coupled with newness of the nation, 
come across as a mirrored reflection of young Singaporeans. Young people 
reflect, in the state's rhetoric, the youth and fragility of the nation itself. This 
reflection is in constant tension with Singaporean politics. In one sense, 
young people are imbued with the potential of the nation. They are thus, in 
the words of Vivienne, "the yeast ensuring Singapore's pre-eminence".
1
 Like 
yeast, however, there is the always the risk that the youth will not rise, and, 
without yeast, can there be any hope that the nation itself will rise 
concurrently?  
On the other hand, an overly active culture threatens hard-won 
political stability. Young people are the future of the nation, but only if they 
comply with the state's expectations will they fulfil this potential. If they fail 
to live up to the state's expectations, young Singaporeans and, by 
implication, the nation, are threatened. This calls for an unusually extensive 
and public policing of youth behaviour as well as the creative negotiation of 
these threats by building upon two of the great strengths of contemporary 
capitalism and Singapore — globalisation and consumption. Encouraged 
and disciplined by the People's Action Party (PAP) to behave, to conform, 
and to consume, the youth of the nation ultimately confirm the PAP's role in 
guiding the nation into the future. 
 
 
NATIONALISM AND SINGAPORE 
 
The emergence of many small nation-states since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union prompted a re-evaluation of established theories of nationalism. 
While a unifying theory of nationalism remains elusive, the recent history of 
nationalism and the many books about it are testimony at least to the variety 
of national experiences. In some respects, Singapore's nationalism is quite 
                                                 
1
  Vivienne, W. 1995. Children, population policy and the state in Singapore. In Sharon Stephens (Ed.). 
Children and the politics of culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
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recognisable in these models. It has a flag, national songs, national days, 
and at least some forms of an "imagined community".
2
 In other respects, it 
is unusual, even singular, among modern nation-states. The history of its 
cultural policy in the face of globalisation is one such example. 
Ernest Gellner suggested that industrial societies require a common 
culture in order to function and that nationalism is an attempt to create such 
a culture.
3
 Globalisation, a product of the spread of industrialised societies, 
is often understood as having the potential to undermine a unifying culture 
and is therefore seen as a threat to the nation-state.
4
 Nationalism and 
globalism thus tend to be framed as contradictory terms that nonetheless 
coexist. In fact, the paradox of globalisation is that at the point where the 
boundaries of the nation-state are dissolving, there has often been a 
simultaneous rise in nationalist sentiment. Specifically for Singapore, being 
global has emerged as a characteristic of being Singaporean. In this sense, 
globalisation can be regarded as a unique nationalist project.  
While globalisation may be linked to Singapore's future, like other 
nations, Singapore has to cope with the question of cultural origins. In 
multi-ethnic states, national identity can be more complex than in a 
culturally and racially homogenous society. The tension between ethnic 
identity and national identity was consciously and carefully navigated in 
Singapore when nationalist policies were first instigated after the country′s 
independence. Rather than relying on cultural heritage to inform nationalist 
policy, as many countries do, Singapore began by deliberately avoiding 
deeper historical narratives. 
Instead of emphasising heritage or culture, the PAP began by 
stressing the shared experience of hardship associated with independence as 
the basis for national unity. Typically, nations showcase their strength and 
age more than their weakness and novelty.
5
 When a country like the US, for 
example, emphasises its newness, it does so as a sign of its strength: it is 
new and vital in comparison to the stale old world of Europe.
6
 For the 
Singaporean government, this inversion was deliberate and successful. The 
newness of the Singaporean state was, and is, constructed as one of the 
causes of its fragility. Precisely because the nation is thought of as fragile, 
                                                 
2
  Benedict, A. 1983. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. New 
York:Verso 
3
  Ernest, G. 1983. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
4
  Leo, S. 2000.  Nation-building and nation-destroying: The challenge of globalisation in Indonesia. In 
Leo, S. (Ed.). Nationalism and globalisation: East and West. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
5
  Jean, C. 1978. Pasts and futures or what is history for?, Schofield Coryell (Trans.). London: Thames 
and Hudson. 
6
  John, B. 1992. Remaking America: Public memory, commemoration and patriotism in the twentieth 
century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
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the government must be regarded as strong. The logic of stressing hardship 
provided the PAP with the legitimisation it needed to rule in the first place, 
and it has continued to be an important strategy for maintaining hegemony.  
Young Singaporeans, raised in more affluent and comfortable times, 
did not experience the hardships of independence, and the Singaporean 
government is careful to remind them of the sacrifices made by the 
generations of their parents and grandparents. In his 2002 National Day 
Speech, for example, the then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong began by 
reflecting on the past and describing his personal circumstances before he 
returned to the present. "Today", he argued, "it is the turn of our young to be 
tested. This baptism of fire will temper your generation". He believed that 
Singapore's youth would survive the baptism: "from your performance in 
National Service and the workplace, and the way you take to sports, I am 
confident that you have what it takes to secure your place under the sun".
7
 
What Goh Chok Tong had to say on this occasion seems quite common but, 
at the same time, it encapsulates the government's position. Singapore relies 
on youth for the future of the nation and reminds them of past hardships by 
way of impressing on them their responsibility to their country.  
 
 
YOUTH DISCIPLINE AND CRIMINALITY 
 
If youth is the future, then shaping youth is shaping the future of the nation. 
The legal system in Singapore is based on the British system and relies on 
English common law, but criminality is rarely understood in Singapore as 
an issue or problem with social causes. Discussion invariably centres on 
individuals, their social deviance and their rejection of societal norms. 
Narrow conceptions of criminality such as these are further restricted by a 
reluctance to view criminality as a product of poverty or circumstance. 
Crime is framed as something committed by "outsiders", either literally, in 
the form of foreign workers, or metaphorically, by those Singaporeans who 
do not conform.
8
  
In punishing the transgressions of non-conformists, the state sends a 
powerful message about the limits of its tolerance and emphatically 
demonstrates its preparedness to punish those who do not submit to its 
vision of the Singapore nation.
9
 John Clammer, in particular, has argued that 
                                                 
7  Goh, C. T. 2002. National day speech. Singapore Government press release. Hereinafter: Goh, Speech.  
8  Ganapathy, N. and Lian, K. F. 2002. Policing minority street corner gangs in Singapore: A view from the street. 
Journal of Policing and Society, 12(2), 139–152.  
9
  Nicole, T. and Alfred, O. 2005. Capital punishment and the culture of developmentalism in Singapore. 
In Austin, S. and Christian, B. (Eds.). The cultural lives of capital punishment: Comparative 
perspectives. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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a discourse of criminality is useful to authority on several levels. It provides 
a scapegoat as well as displacing or disguising "class, race and gender as the 
key issues in public discourse" and thereby legitimises piecemeal social 
policy "solutions" rather than wholesale political reform.
10
 As a result, in 
addition to the usual institutional sites of youth discipline such as family, 
church, or school, Singapore has placed particular public emphasis on the 
uncompromising disciplining of youth via crime and punishment  
The 1994 caning of Michael P. Fay, an American teenager, provides a 
pertinent example of crime committed by others. Fay was sentenced to 
caning after he had been found guilty of vandalising cars and stealing road 
signs. Controversially, the Singaporean government was unflinching in its 
determination to carry out the sentence despite diplomatic intervention by 
the United States. In part, this determination arose because the caning of 
Fay functioned as an object lesson for young Singaporeans. Richard Deck, 
for example, argued that the caning of Fay was manipulated and staged by 
the government as a warning to young Singaporeans, especially those who 
gathered in the downtown area of Orchard Mall. For Deck, the incident was 
"a form of deterrence, aimed at the enhancement of the nation's Social, 
Psychological and Economic Defence".
11
 The starkly visible punishment of 
youth crime works to discipline the young, regardless of who was caned. 
The combination of the Fay incident, Singapore's abolition of legal 
appeals to the Privy Council in 1994, and the execution of Flor 
Contemplacion in 1996 led to increased international interest in the 
prosecution of crime on the island. Partly because of the unwelcome and 
hostile nature of this attention, it has become increasingly difficult to 
research crime in Singapore. Goh Chok Tong, for example, facilitated a 
tightening of access to information about crime and government secrecy 
over crime statistics. According to Amnesty International, however, 
Singapore has one of the highest incidents of capital punishment, with 357 
deaths since 1991. It is impossible to confirm these statistics — these data 
were once available via a government publication, Statistical Report on 
Crime in Singapore, but access to this publication is now restricted. 
Historically, permission for access has had to be granted by the Criminal 
Intelligence Unit of the Criminal Investigations Department, and even if 
permission is given, the publication of the figures is prohibited.
12
  
                                                 
10
  John, C. 1998. Framing the other: Criminality, social exclusion and social engineering in developing 
Singapore. In Catherine, J. F. and Mike, N. (Eds.). Crime and social exclusion. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. Hereinafter: John, Framing the other. 
11
  Richard, D. 1999. Singapore: Comprehensive security — total defence. In Ken, B. and Russell, T. 
(Eds.). Strategic cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London: Macmillan Press. 
12
 Laurence, W. L. 1997. Singapore. In Donald, J. W. and Richard, G. (Eds.). Sociological control of 
homosexuality: A multi-nation comparison. New York: Plenum Press. 
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It is notable that while access to crime information is limited, there is 
simultaneously an increased focus on crime in Singapore. A visible public 
discourse of crime, after all, does not necessarily depend on the publication 
of charts or statistics. Some crime stories are perhaps even easier to tell in 
the absence of potentially contradictory information. Consider, for example, 
issues of crime and race. In Singapore, there is a racial component within 
the discourse on crime: domestic criminality is portrayed as a particularly 
Malay problem.
13
 Drug addiction, for instance, is framed as a "Malay 
problem" and cast as symptomatic of Malay criminality rather than as a 
manifestation of socio-economic marginality. When crime is symbolically 
attributed to non-Malay ethnic groups, it is in terms of specific crimes, 
rather than criminality per se. Gambling, for example, is associated with the 
Chinese community. However, there is no desire or willingness to confirm 
these symbolic attachments with the published data. 
The idea of crime is packed with meaning in Singapore. In Clammer's 
view, crime is not to be solely understood as offenses against persons or 
property. Instead, it reflects a deeper meaning — it is a pollution or cancer 
that, if not cured, will then infect the greater society. Crime in Singapore, 
then, is framed as "the first sign of the unravelling of the carefully 
constructed and managed social fabric of Singapore". Further, the state 
ultimately constructs crime as "ingratitude, a perverse unwillingness to co-
operate in bringing about the utopia that the government is so painstakingly 
building".
14
 Such noncompliance necessitates state intervention.  
Because crime is framed as an individual rejection of Singaporean 
values, the citizen, not the state, is framed as at fault. Citizens must thus be 
"monitored for their own good" and crime is understood not as an outcome 
of social conditions, but as the chaos which could ensue if order is 
disturbed. Crime becomes a willingness to give up the "Singapore Dream". 
Citizens are not excluded by the state — rather, "they excluded themselves" 
by their refusal to participate in the dominant narrative.  
Clammer extends this to argue that Singapore is a totalitarian state 
precisely because it requires total commitment and that noncompliance 
makes the citizen deviant and subject to the condemnation of the "system".
15
 
Applying Clammer's analysis specifically to the issue of youth crime, 
discussions of youth in Singapore are never far from discussions of 
delinquency, a consequence of people too readily being able to imagine that 
one bad apple might spoil the whole crop. Young people, in particular, are 
                                                 
13
 Lily, R. 1998. The Singapore dilemma: The political and educational marginality of the Malay 
community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
14
 John, Framing the other. 
15
 Ibid., 146. 
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seen as making choices that result in "excluding themselves".
16
 These 
choices have predominantly to do with education — the delinquent child 
chooses not to succeed academically and chooses crime and socially 
unacceptable behaviour, such as loitering and smoking. For the doubled 
youth of the nation, even these minor transgressions must be nipped in the 
bud, lest they grow into poisoned fruit. Environment or circumstances are 
generally not included as causal factors. 
In addition to the Fay incident, 1994 was a pivotal moment in the 
public articulation of anxiety about youth crime in Singapore, with the PAP 
commissioning a study on "problem youths in Singapore" and ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, making a series of speeches about the issue. 
The formation, in the same year, of the Inter-Ministry Committee on 
Dysfunctional Families, Juvenile Delinquency and Drug Abuse, as 
evidenced in its title, made clear that youth problems could be traced back 
to families and personal responsibility. Youth must be disciplined to take 
responsibility for their own choices but are also responsible in the behaviour 
of their peers via mentoring schemes such as the True Hearts Connection 
Mentoring and Befriender Scheme, in the success of other youth.
17
 From the 
Justice Teen Quest to Streetwise Programs, young people are made 
responsible for their choices, for their future, for their peer community, and 
for their relationship with the nation.  
In June 2000, Project Bridge, a program specially designed for early 
school leavers, was launched. Young people between the ages of thirteen 
and nineteen who were not enrolled in formal education had already been 
identified as being at higher risk for delinquency. The focus of the program 
was to help early school leavers or out-of-school youths (OSY) either to 
return to education, to find work or to explore other talents. Early school 
leavers were constructed as doubly deviant, both in the sense of deviating 
from the right path and in the sense of moral corruption, a trend that, left 
unchecked, might spread. At the first anniversary of the project, Ho Peng 
Kee, then-Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs and Chairman of the 
Inter-Ministry Committee on youth crime, challenged those who have been 
turned around by Project Bridge to help others who are in trouble, 
imploring these re-invented citizens to "be a bridge over troubled waters".
18
  
                                                 
16
  Ho, P. K. 2001. The 1st anniversary of project bridge. Speech by Minister of State for Law and Home 
Affairs and Chairman of the Inter-Ministry Committee on Youth Crime. Singapore Government press 
release. Hereinafter: Ho, The 1st anniversary of project bridge speech.  
17
  Alfred, C. and Wing, L. T. 2004. Fighting youth crime: A comparative study of two little dragons in 
Asia. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.  
18
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Just like the recipients of the National Youth Achievement Award 
(NYAA), the no-longer-troubled youth have an obligation to reach their 
potential and contribute to society. The importance of obligation was clearly 
spelled out in the NYAA special presentation for youth inmates. In the 
context of young criminals, these awards are not about "opportunities for 
development and personal growth",
19
 but instead emphasise "a sense of 
responsibility to themselves, society and their nation".
20
 Ho Peng Kee stated 
that despite an individual's background, the NYAA Scheme adopted by the 
Prison Department illustrates well the motto "Every Singaporean Matters". 
Each Singaporean has an allotted role to play, and those who deviate must 
be brought back into the fold so that they play that part. Those who choose 
not to run the race or be the best they can be are letting society down.  
 
 
NATIONAL SERVICE 
 
The PAP tends to equate youth with boys, reflecting their priorities. That is, 
they care more, though not exclusively, about disciplining male youth. 
National service provides an additional opportunity to regulate and 
discipline young men in Singapore. Providing a common experience for 
male Singaporeans, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is a key tool in 
nation building. Tai Ming Cheung, writing for the Far Eastern Economic 
Review, suggested that although the primary mission of the SAF was 
military defence, its efforts to instil patriotism and discipline, racial 
cohesion and "defence awareness" amongst the population, were equally 
important. In this sense, the SAF is a key component of a Singaporean 
identity.
21
 
The two-year period of compulsory military service is intense, 
affording the Singaporean government almost unrestricted access to the 
minds of young men and being constructed as a male rite of passage to 
citizenship. According to Alfred Oehlers, these young men "are immersed in 
a hierarchical and authoritarian culture, where an intense nationalism is 
cultivated, as well as discipline and an unquestioning obedience to 
                                                 
19
 John, C. National Youth Achievement Award Presentation Ceremony. Speech by Minister of State for 
Communications and Information Technology and National Development. Singapore Government 
press release (17 February 2001). Hereinafter: John, National Youth Achievement Award presentation 
ceremony speech. 
20
 Ho, P. K. 2001. The National Youth Achievement Award, Special Presentation Ceremony. Speech by 
Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs and Chairman of the Inter-Ministry Committee on Youth 
Crime. Singapore Government press release. 
21
 Tai, M. C. 1991. Ideological mission. Far Eastern Economic Review, 154,16. 
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authority".
22
 Twice yearly, male Singapore citizens are given an opportunity 
to reinforce national values and obedience by spending a weekend 
upgrading and maintaining their skill base. 
National service operates on a number of levels to reinforce 
obedience, not least by offering employment opportunities.
23
 Certainly, 
Singapore's security culture emphasises the vulnerability of the nation. The 
heightened awareness of this vulnerability leads Chin Kin Wah to describe 
Singapore as suffering from "small-nation syndrome".
24
 Derek Da Cunha 
argued that "one of the pillars underpinning the success of Singapore as a 
nation-state is its armed forces".
25
 It may be more accurate to say that 
discipline, cohesion, and obedience, maximised by national service, have 
been the pillars underpinning the youth of the nation of Singapore.  
 
 
YOUTH AS FUTURE OF THE NATION 
 
In 1996, the post-Independence generation was described by Goh Chok 
Tong as having come of age.
26
 More than half of Singapore's population in 
1996 was born after independence. If we consider, as Goh Chok Tong 
suggested, that only those Singaporeans who were young adults at the time 
of Independence can know and understand Independence from personal 
experience, then only one quarter of Singaporeans know Independence.
27
 
Given, however, that the Singaporean government relies heavily on 
constructions of Independence as a shared hardship that unites 
Singaporeans, it is essential to pass the discourse, meanings, and symbolism 
of Independence on to young Singaporeans. At the Teacher's Day Rally in 
1996, Goh Chok Tong identified this problem and provided the solution. He 
argued that because hardships and vulnerabilities are not part of the 
collective memory of young Singaporeans, they need to "shape their 
attitudes" to understand "how we got to where we are".
28
 Goh Chok Tong in 
                                                 
22
  Alfred, O. 1998. Youth in Singapore: Agents for social and political change? Journal of Futures 
Studies, 3(1), 8. 
23
  Tim, H. 1993. The political role of the Singapore armed forces officer corps: Towards a military-
administrative state? Working paper no. 279, Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra. 
24
  Chin, K. W. 2000. Reflections on the shaping of strategic cultures in Southeast Asia. In Derek Da 
Cunha (Ed.). Southeast Asian perspectives on security. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
25
  Derek, D. C. 1999. Sociological aspects of the Singapore armed forces. Armed Forces and Society, 
25(3), 468.  
26
  Straits Times. 1996. Equipping our young for the future. (9 September 1996). 
27
  Ibid. 
28
  Goh Chok Tong, quoted in Straits Times. 1996. Equipping our young for the future. (9 September 
1996).  
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effect launched a Youth is Future campaign which showed no sign of 
abating in the new millennium.  
At the National Youth Achievement Award (NYAA) presentation 
ceremony in 2001, John Chen, then Minister of State for Communications 
and Information Technology and National Development, articulated the 
relationship between youth and the future of Singapore. Characterising 
young people as "our precious assets", Chen stated that providing 
opportunities for their advancement was "key to our survival". During the 
ceremony, the success of youth was constructed as the success of the nation, 
and what was good for youth was deemed to be good for the nation. The 
NYAA is seen as a program that "engages youth in a systematic and 
meaningful process to maximise their potential".
29
 The development of the 
nation requires the maximisation of the youth's potential for the "social 
health" of the citizenry, a point made by several other members of 
parliament.
30
 
At the People's Association Youth Movement 30th Anniversary 
Dinner in 2001, then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong built on the 
theme developed by John Chen, declaring to his young audience: "youths 
are the future of Singapore", and "you have to build tomorrow's Singapore 
on the foundations of what the earlier generation has accomplished". Having 
established a link with past achievements, Lee Hsien Loong appealed to 
Singapore's small size and relative vulnerability to justify a future 
characterised by individual autonomy. Lee Hsien Loong effectively 
established Singaporean youth as critical to the future yet constrained by 
that future. 
 
 
POST-INDEPENDENCE GENERATIONS  
 
Historically, different generational waves of young Singaporeans have been 
positioned quite differently with regard to discourses of politics and the 
nation, leading to continual evolutions of policy and ideology. In contrast to 
the youth of the 1950s and 1960s, who were active in bringing about 
Singapore's decolonisation, and perhaps in response to the powerful 
disciplining functions of state institutions, the youth of the 1990s and 2000s 
are relatively apolitical. As Huang Jianli pointed out, this came about in part 
from a conscious positioning of student activism of that period as binary and 
                                                 
29
  John, National Youth Achievement Award presentation ceremony speech.  
30
  David, T. E. L 2001. Making youth development our growing business. Speech by Minister of State for 
Defence and Information and the Arts. Singapore Government press release.  
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problematic.
31
 This changed situation calls for a different approach — 
apolitical young people fracture the discursive doubling of the "youth of the 
nation" by their lack of interest in connecting nation to identity, thus 
threatening the dominant narrative of Singaporean nationalism. 
From the 1990s, a slow and bounded re-evaluation of youth political 
apathy has taken place. Under Goh Chock Tong, three distinct post-
independence youth generations were identified. In the 1990s, the term 
"brain-drain generation" pointed to a cohort of educated young 
Singaporeans who were not returning home after overseas study. In 2001, 
"Generation Millennium (M)" was named in the media — a younger and 
more affluent generation than the brain-drain group.
32
 Then in 2002, Goh 
Chok Tong drew attention to an in-between group, young people in their 
twenties whom he dichotomised as quitters and stayers, in the process 
defining another post-independence generation.  
From an examination of the discourse developed around these three 
generations, it becomes clear that the Singaporean government is 
preoccupied with a desire to minimise the migration of young Singaporeans 
or, more accurately, to minimise the effects of migration by keeping young 
Singaporeans ideologically connected to the nation state, whatever their 
spatial location. It sought to do so by inculcating youth with a national 
identity capable of being expressed through consumption.  
 
 
BRAIN DRAIN 1990s 
 
In the 1990s, the best and brightest of Singapore's young people appeared 
unconvinced by the bargain their parents had struck with the PAP, 
sacrificing liberty for wealth.
33
 The new generation apparently found the 
freedoms of Canada, Australia and New Zealand more enticing. Echoing 
the emphasis on individual responsibility in discourses of criminality, the 
Singaporean media tended to discuss this phenomenon in terms of 
ingratitude, an inattention to duty, and a lack of responsibility towards the 
nation that provided formative education and resources. According to 
David Birch, the act of leaving was presented as a "mistake or an irrational 
act" by the errant child-citizens who had not paid their debt to Singapore 
                                                 
31
  Huang, J. 2006. Positioning the student political activism of Singapore: Articulation, contestation and 
omission. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 7(3), 406.  
32
  Leslie, K. and Stephanie, Y. 2001. Goodbye- Gen-X, Hello Gen-M. Straits Times, (3 May 2001). 
Hereinafter: Leslie and Stephanie, Straits Times. 
33
  Russell, H. 1995. Give me liberty or give me wealth. In Derek Da Chunha (Ed.). Debating Singapore: 
Reflective essays. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.  
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and who therefore represented a bad risk. In this connection, the state was 
constructed as a "benign and concerned parent" that knows what is best for 
the child-citizen.
34
  
Goh Chok Tong personified the "benign parent" figure described by 
Birch and tried to find ways to keep the child-citizens from leaving. In the 
programmatic policy document Singapore: The Next Lap, for example, he 
focused on minimising the outflow and outlined ways to encourage 
Singaporeans to stay at home and to develop a sense of loyalty to Singapore 
and a sense of Singaporean identity and national consciousness. He 
especially emphasised the responsibilities of overseas Singaporeans to be 
loyal to the nation — Singaporeans who live and work overseas do not just 
export their services, he pointed out; they must act as ambassadors of 
Singapore, promoting goodwill and building a positive image of Singapore 
internationally.
35
  
The issue was considered in detail in the Singaporean media during 
the 1990s in articles, editorials and letters to the editor. Advertisements 
under the rubric of "Singapore My Home" and later, "Singapore My Best 
Home", alerted the public to the "homeliness" of Singapore.
36
 Networks for 
Singaporeans living or studying overseas were established that relied on the 
now-defunct Radio Singapore International (RSI) and evolved to include 
Internet broadcasting and web-based discussion groups. RSI's mandate was 
to help overseas Singaporeans "share in Singapore's development 
experience" by keeping them in touch with the news from home.
37
 New 
technologies serve to minimise distance and have been employed by the 
government to help Singaporeans, especially the young, remain connected 
to their country. 
Associated with discussions of migration were debates about the 
avoidance of military service. Some citizens firmly believed that others were 
leaving Singapore to avoid military service, either for themselves or for their 
children, and said as much in letters to the papers.
38
 Part of this discussion 
focused on what should happen when Singaporeans who have lived overseas 
come back to Singapore yet have not completed their military service. As 
one article in the Straits Times suggested — they should be allowed back but 
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not welcomed with the red carpet. After all, by leaving, "they have betrayed 
their country, and are ungrateful".
39
  
News reports and editorials reinforced the message carried in 
advertisements and communications from the government and concerned 
public. "Home is where the heart is", proclaimed an article published in the 
Straits Times. The article purported to be an entertaining lifestyle piece 
about lawyer-playwright Eleanor Wong, but a close reading shows reveals a 
modern parable about people returning to Singapore. Wong was successful, 
had a high-flying legal career, was well-published, and had returned to 
Singapore. According to Wong, this was because in New York she felt no 
responsibility. She noted that, "New York may be a beautiful home, but 
Singapore is mine and I have a responsibility towards it".
40
  
 
 
GENERATION MILLENNIUM 2001 
 
Much of the Generation M commentary is negative, from Goh Chok Tong's 
description of them "as a generation born with a silver spoon in its mouth",
41
 
to newspaper columnist Warren Fernandez's anxieties over their lack of 
knowledge about the past.
42
 However, this is an over-simplification. As with 
many political constructions in Singapore, Generation M exists on a number 
of levels and can thus be exploited in different ways.  
A comparison can be made between Generation M and the shinjinrui, 
Japan's "new breed" of youth. Fumie Kumagai described the characteristics 
of this generation as "raised in an affluent society, they have no experience 
of poverty or starvation; they are whimsical, emotional and playful; they 
display a cold reserve towards things that do not interest them; and they 
have extremely strong ties with peers".
43
 Kamagai also pointed to other 
qualities of the shinjinrui, such as a reluctance to grow up and a lack of 
social commitment. While not all these attributes could be applied to 
Generation M, affluence, strong peer relationships, and apathy are 
commonalities. Parallels can also be drawn with emerging elite youth in 
Malaysia, where Western-style modernity has been perceived as a threat to 
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the social fabric of the nation.
44
 Their Generation Y contemporaries in the 
United are viewed more benevolently, but the associations with affluence 
are just as marked.  
For Singapore, the discourse of Generation M works to legitimate 
government discussions of responsibility and belonging and simultaneously 
provides an explanation for the political non-involvement of young people 
that can avoid discussions of discipline. In its defining article on Generation 
M, the Straits Times provided a guide to identifying Generation Mers, 
complete with descriptions of their clothes and hangouts and accompanied 
by photographic evidence.
45
 If a physical description and a location guide 
were not enough, readers were advised that members of Generation M could 
be detected by their attitudes and accessories. The typical Generation M was 
an affluent, IT-savvy, mobile-phone-toting, self-centred, high achiever who 
globe-trotted but cared little for politics. Such an approach was summed up 
by fourteen-year-old Jean Pek: 
 
My main concerns are my studies, shopping, track and 
field, and friends. I have no interest in current affairs or 
local events, although my teachers mention them 
occasionally… It is too troublesome to find out about 
them, and they don′t affect me personally.46 
 
Jean Pek's comment and others like it provoked some anxiety. In responding 
to a New Paper poll that indicated that young Singaporeans knew little 
about their history or current events, Goh Chok Tong said he was 
"frightened" by this information.
47
 Some Singaporeans are concerned that 
the future of the nation lies in the hands of those who do not care.
48
 If 
Generation M feels no link to Singapore, then they might leave, taking their 
expensive education and talent elsewhere. As then-Deputy Prime Minister 
(and later Prime Minister) Lee Hsien Loong noted, "Singaporean youths 
must have wings and yet know where their nest is".
49
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However, Generation M is not uniformly viewed negatively, which 
distinguishes it from the brain-drain cohort. Straits Times columnist Monica 
Gwee in "The great Singapore hope", described the greatest luxury of 
Generation M as the ability "to dream beyond boundaries".
50
 For the "brain-
drainers," departure could worryingly be read as an expression of political 
dissent. For Generation M, however, the lack of political engagement has 
begun to depoliticise the meanings attributed to leaving Singapore.  
 
 
QUITTERS VERSUS STAYERS 2002 
 
Brain-drainers are ungrateful and political. Generation M apolitically 
dreams. With the 2002 political slogan of "Quitters and Stayers", the 
resultant tensions were negotiated via emotional connections and the 
nationalism of consumption. In his National Day speech in 2002, Goh Chok 
Tong spoke about two kinds of Singaporeans: those "quitters" or fair-
weather citizens who migrate, and the "stayers" who are "committed to 
Singapore. Rain or shine, they will be with Singapore". Being a "stayer" 
does not necessarily mean actually staying in Singapore. In Goh Chok 
Tong's formulation, it included Singaporeans who live overseas but "who 
will come back when needed because their hearts are here. The Singapore 
nation is not just those of us living here but also the thousands of loyal 
Singaporeans who live around the world".
51
 In this sense, being Singaporean 
was constructed as a state of mind.  
In keeping with the established pattern of endorsing the future with 
reference to the past, Goh Chok Tong reminded Singaporeans of the 
harshness of the past and the "never-say-die, can-do spirit" that "gave us the 
peace and prosperity we enjoy today".
52
 Goh Chok Tong then expressed his 
belief in young Singaporeans, saying, "I believe the large majority of our 
youths are 'stayers' and have not gone soft. The men do National Service. 
The women support them".
53
 
Stayers are the present as well as the future. Their specific 
responsibilities are already quite heavy. Not only must they "feel deeply for 
Singapore", stayers must also translate these feelings into economic actions. 
Goh Chok Tong singled out those Singaporeans who purchased cheaper real 
estate in Australia, rather than investing in Singapore, as undermining the 
future of Singapore. Such actions have the potential to turn Singapore from 
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a home to a hotel. Stayers may make money overseas but they are expected 
not only to be loyal to Singapore but also to feel they belong there. To 
explain this position, Goh Chok Tong quoted Singaporean director Jack 
Neo, who claimed that in Singapore "I'm the No. 1 wife. Elsewhere, I′m the 
concubine".
54
  
 
 
YOUTH ON THE SCREEN OF A MOBILE PHONE  
 
Having an apolitical youth, while appealing in some ways to the PAP, has 
an inherent limitation. The PAP enjoys being popular. In practical terms, 
then, when young people become voters, they must be political enough to 
cast a vote for the PAP. From as early as 1987, the PAP had a youth wing 
called the Young PAP (YP). Its explicit function is to help the PAP maintain 
its position as the "mainstream political party" via the recruitment of 
younger members and leaders and by providing a site for the expression of 
the "aspirations of young Singaporeans".
55
 The YP Blog provides space for 
members to talk about political and social concerns with the intention of 
building a better Singapore in the process.
56
 There is also life after YP, 
where members of the YP who reach 40 and are therefore no longer young 
are graduated from the organisation and encouraged to take up positions in 
the original PAP.
57
 While the YP have been highly successful in helping the 
PAP maintain its position, like most political parties, it remains dominated 
by older members.  
Ever adaptive, the PAP has sought to make the party more appealing 
to young people. Younger parliamentarians attempted hip-hop dance 
routines, for example, while maintaining their wholesome image. Or given 
their engagement with popular technology, Singaporean youth were asked 
to text message their suggestions about political images to the state. 
However, as Kenneth Tan noted, in the eyes of some, given this trivialised 
youth participation, the vision of a monumental nation was to be contained 
within the tiny screen of a mobile phone.
58
 To an extent, this is a metaphor 
for the PAP's view of youth: participation that is contained, guided, and 
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necessarily limited. Within the vision of limited participation, youth are 
expected to be shoppers. Singapore is a society that is pre-occupied with 
consumption, and youth consumption is an area that has received particular 
attention in terms of its role in nation building. 
 
 
CONSUMPTION 
 
Youth spending in Singapore is high in part because of living arrangements, 
which tend to keep young Singaporeans at home until marriage. Living at 
home shields young people from expenditures on major items and leads to 
"a window for unlimited consumption" for consumer goods.
59
 It also leads 
to criticisms that young Singaporeans are excessive and that they are too 
Western. The consumption of Western fashions provides an example of how 
tensions over excess and Westernisation are raised by specific consumption 
practices. Hilary Rader asked: "does consumption always work in the 
service of a hegemonic structure or are there ways in which consumption 
offers a space for resistance against the very structures that it would appear 
to represent?"
60
 Rader answered her question by suggesting that it is 
possible to subvert consumption in a variety of ways. But for young 
Singaporeans, consumption is about conformity and compliance. While 
objects or artefacts can be consumed in such a way as to give "meaning 
through their active incorporation in people's lives",
61
 in Singapore, the act 
of consumption works as a nationalist activity.  
Chua Beng-Huat suggests that the Singaporean government 
simultaneously advocates a consumption culture and a culture of restraint 
and that authoritarian states require high economic growth in order to 
rationalise authoritarianism.
62
 For Singapore, this has been coupled with a 
high-savings policy designed to reduce dependency on international 
borrowing and increase capital. The economic crises of 1997 and 2008 
heightened the emphasis on restraint. However, young Singaporeans who 
have grown up in a context of comparative affluence have been more 
inclined to spend than save.  
Although consumption can pose dangers to the society in terms of its 
capacities to undermine cultural identity, Singaporeans are undoubtedly 
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encouraged to consume. Consumption cohabits with cosmopolitanism. 
Wing Meng Ho has gone as far as to characterise Singaporean affluence as 
"an obsessive preoccupation with the pursuit and acquisition of pecuniary 
and material gains and the honorific display of wealth", while Lee Weng 
Choy has argued that one of the underlying ideological agendas of the 
nation-building project is "to serve multinational capital accumulation".
63
 
From this perspective, the future of the nation can be seen to rely on the 
consumption practices, present and future, of young Singaporeans.  
Connections between youth and consumption are exemplified by 
government-supported websites aimed at youth. One part of a Singapore 
Education website, for example, advertises that "Singaporeans live to shop" 
and "live, eat, and shop in the heartlands".
64
 Similarly, the Government-
sponsored site (www.youth.sg), self-described as "unprecedented virtual 
space for Singaporean youth to get thinking and exchange views on issues 
that affect them", includes links to dozens of shopping sites in various 
articles.
65
 
A particularly telling connection between youth, consumption, and 
nationalism was exemplified by the National Heritage Board in July 2005.
66
 
As part of the celebration of Singapore's 40th birthday, the self-described 
"tongue-in-cheek" look at "Icons and Identities of Singapore" was exhibited 
at the Singapore History Museum, Riverside Point. The exhibit was 
conceptualised around five themes: "Love Me, Love My Stuff!" 
(collectables), "Love Me, Build Me!" (architecture), "Love Me, Obey Me" 
(government campaigns), "Love Me, Make Me Rich" (prosperity icons), and 
"Love Me, Visit Me" (tourism images). The easy slippages across these 
various meanings of "me" — referring in turn to the built environment, the 
State, and the citizen — parallel the discursive doubling of the youth of the 
nation.  
Unpacked, the message of the exhibit is simple and essentially 
Singaporean: Love Singapore (in all its guises), Obey the PAP, get rich, and 
love your stuff. In this case, the stuff was an exhibit of Hello Kitty 
collectibles, reiterating and reflecting both the importance of youth and the 
connections of youth to global consumption. That is, in consuming global 
culture, young Singaporeans are participating in nationalism: as Lee Weng 
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Choy noted, "nationalism and globalisation achieve a symbiosis in 
Singapore".
67
 In this sense, to consume is to conform, not subvert.  
 
 
YOUTH AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 
 
While young people may transmogrify into the future nation, they can also 
pose a threat to the social and political order of the nation. As brain-
drainers, as over-discerning consumers, as uninformed Generation Mers, or 
as quitters, these compliant conservative youths retain the capacity to inspire 
anxieties about the security of the future. A regime of social discipline is 
thus required to regulate the young. Education systems provide the most 
obvious example of such a regime. National service and social regulation 
also reinforce political and social discipline. In Singapore, Chua observed, 
"every aspect of life is rationalised to increase orderliness; orderliness is a 
'totalising' strategy of the government".
68
 Themes such as these are explored 
in popular culture — film and television — and also in the creative arts.  
Young people have historically facilitated social change, and many 
international observers of Southeast Asia see youth as a potential force for 
democratic change.
69
 In both Malaysia and Indonesia, pressure for change 
has been associated with the young.
70
 In Singapore, however, little evidence 
exists to suggest that there is a growth of such democratic movements. 
Despite the presence of social satire in forums such as TalkingCock.com
71
 
and the podcasts of the infamous Mr. Brown,
72
 these forums are not 
democratic movements per se. Indeed, they are too sophisticated in both 
content and form to be led by the young. As Oehlers argued, "youth in 
Singapore appear to be content to conform to visions of the future 
elaborated by the PAP". Their contentment is a direct consequence of 
policies that concomitantly "cultivate and perpetuate traditional conservative 
values" and work in unison with "punitive measures to ensure 
compliance".
73
 The appearance of Singapore and Singaporean youth as 
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Westernised is often misread as a move towards liberalism.
74
 That is, factors 
such as information technology, globalisation, and youth popular culture do 
not lead Singaporean youth towards political liberty. 
 
 
YOUTH AND THE INTERNET 
 
The Internet is often presented as a political tool that can be used against 
authoritarian states, such as Singapore or China. Saskia Sassen, for example, 
proposed that the Internet would, if not remove, at least limit authoritarian 
control.
75
 In 1998, D. Perrit maintained that "totalitarian regimes" can no 
longer "ensure themselves a safe environment by controlling the 
newspapers, radio and television stations because the World Wide Web 
remains beyond their control and manipulation".
76
 The potential for the 
transformation of Singaporean society has often been attributed to 
technological advancement, inextricably intertwined with an image of the 
young Singaporean computer whiz and policy initiatives such as IT 2000 
Vision, which sought to make Singapore the "Intelligent Island". A number 
of scholars have challenged this assumption in the Singaporean context.  
Rather than seeking the prohibition of the Internet, the Singaporean 
state seeks regulation.
77
 IT 2000 – A Vision of an Intelligent Island 
envisioned Singapore's future as that of an IT Hub that relied on significant 
technical skills, particularly among the young.
78
 Internet access links 
domestic, public and private spaces to facilitate commercial transactions and 
communication with the state. In this sense, the government simultaneously 
sought to encourage and regulate the Internet.  
Regulation comes primarily from the Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority (SBA), although as Peng Hwa Ang and Berlinda Nadarajan noted, 
it is unusual to classify the Internet as a broadcast service.
79
 The SBA is 
empowered through legislation and industry guidelines to censor Internet 
sites as it would other media. The Computer Crime Branch acts in tandem 
with the SBA, patrolling websites and chatrooms in order to keep them 
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"safe".
80
 Extensive self-censorship, particularly with regard to political 
material, also creates an informal regulation of the Internet in Singapore.
81
 
With all Internet Service Providers being owned by the Singaporean 
government or its subsidiaries, it is not surprising that some citizens have 
come to the conclusion that the Internet is more closely monitored in 
Singapore than elsewhere.  
For Singapore, tension exists between the desire to be at the 
technological forefront and the need to contain technology.
82
 In conjunction 
with extensive regulation, this attitude serves to reduce the potential of 
technology to bring about social or political change. To expect youth, in this 
context, to facilitate change via technology, is unrealistic. Oehlers argued 
that in Singapore, the Internet "does not occupy a space independent or 
beyond the nation state".
83
 Until it does, the Internet will act as a tool for the 
maintenance of the authoritarian status quo.  
 
 
YOUTH AND GLOBALISATION 
 
Representing a major focus of political activity for youth internationally 
over the past decade have been globalisation and associated concerns. A 
lateral connection can be identified between this phenomenon and the 
aspirations concerning Singaporean youth as "future makers", as the 
globalisation of a discourse on human rights has been viewed in some 
quarters as an inevitable agent of political and social change. Anthony 
Woodiwiss has argued that only slight legislative change is needed to turn 
Singapore into a human rights-friendly nation. "Enforceable benevolence" 
is, in his opinion, not far away. It will, according to Woodiwiss, be created 
by "a hybrid paradigm that combines elements of the socialist, patriarchalist 
and liberal traditions together in a way that is appropriate to the global 
economic conditions faced by, as well as to the aspirations of, its 
population". In an over simplification of the Singaporean rights culture, he 
outlined five minor legislative changes that he believes would facilitate 
fundamental social change. These are: 
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the strengthening of the independence of the lower 
judiciary; the abolition of the judicial commissioners; the 
conformation of the currently unused precedent… which 
allows appeals to the Supreme Court from the Arbitration 
Court and, finally, the clarification of the status of the 
constitution.
84
 
 
By focusing on legislative change, Woodiwiss ignored the political 
reality of Singapore. It is not legislation that curbs human rights in 
Singapore, but the Singaporean government. Oehlers has suggested that 
Singapore has a peculiar form of political corruption, the chief objective of 
which is "the maintenance of the political pre-eminence of the ruling PAP" 
through securing popular acquiescence.
85
 Minor legislative changes would 
not alter this situation any more than they could compensate for the absence 
of youth activism in the public domain. The two factors are undoubtedly 
closely connected.  
At the heart of Woodiwiss' analysis is the assumption that the state 
and citizenry are out of step in Singapore. That is, that the state is more 
repressive and conservative than the populace. Statistics showing high 
levels of migration and desires to migrate provide some support for this 
analysis, but public discussions about values and censorship suggest the 
opposite.
86
 The deep conservatism of Singaporeans shows much of the 
population to be in fundamental sympathy with the state.
87
 In a survey 
prepared by the Censorship Review Committee, an emphatic no was given 
to "liberal values and permissiveness", with 67% disapproving of such 
Western liberal touchstones as pre-marital sex and cohabitation and 86% 
disapproving of homosexuality and lesbianism.
88
  
Those Singaporeans who do feel comfortable with social 
liberalisation have been granted a special place in the margins of 
Singaporean society by virtue of the paradigm of "cosmopolitans" and 
"heartlanders", which allows pride of place to the moral majority. In his 
1999 National Day Rally speech, Goh Chok Tong proposed that 
"Heartlanders play a major role in maintaining our core values and our 
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social stability. They are the core of our society. Without them, there will be 
no safe and stable Singapore, in Singapore system, no Singapore brand 
name".
89
 Social liberalisation, personified by young, moneyed, 
internationally educated globetrotters, is thus a threat to the core as well as 
its antithesis. 
 
 
YOUTH POPULAR CULTURE 
 
Music and theatre are among the few domains in which youth have shown 
some potential to voice dissent or give expression to modestly different 
values. Accordingly, the government has been strongly interventionist in 
these domains. In 1994, for example, the PAP passed an act that prohibited 
script-less performances.
90
 The PAP felt that improvisational performances, 
such as PlayBack Theatre, posed too great a threat to social stability. Alfran 
Sa'at, a young Singaporean poet, wrote sardonically about the prohibition of 
script-less performances. He said, "even the zoo will not be spared. 
Enclosures will be dismantled, a lion will leap from its cage, utter a roar, 
and will be immediately shot down by the police for an unscripted 
performance without a license".
91
 
Hostility towards youth culture is especially evident in the Singapore 
music scene, where local music with a Western influence was briefly 
banned in the 1970s because of its links to drug use.
92
 Within the now 
emerging alternative music scene in Singapore, as with other societies, non-
conformist appearances are signals and symbols of involvement or 
association with that set. In Singapore, however, non-conformity to norms 
of appearance amount to making a very significant statement. For a period 
in the 1970s and 1980s it was illegal for men in Singapore to have long hair, 
defined as hair that at least reaches the collar of a buttoned shirt. Articulated 
in terms of a rejection of Western morals, visitors to Singapore were subject 
to this regulation, and customs officials cut hair to the appropriate length. 
Within the alternative music scene male, long hair was a symbol of 
belonging to this alternative set.  
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In a song, produced by the local band Raw Fish, the restrictive 
atmosphere and state intervention was questioned: 
 
I don't know if you are a god, or a king 
Or if you are government 
Show me a sign that says if I chew bubble gum 
I will fall straight into fire, fire in hell. 
 
Yes, you have god-like powers 
Show me a sign that you are a god and not government 
Show me a sign that I must be your slave and you my 
master 
And I will be your NS [National Service] man.
93
 
 
The power of this song was tempered, however, by the fact that the state 
mediates the dissemination of popular music through actions such as 
sponsoring cheaper editions of songs without swear words.
94
 The 
Singaporean government also sponsors the "Singapore Songs", an annual 
competition for songs about life in Singapore, which receive extensive 
publicity, with the top ten songs for each year released on both CD and 
video.
95
 Popular music performers are used by the state for the performance 
of National Day songs, and songs are sent out to community centres and 
schools so that everyone can learn them. Wee discussed a related 
phenomenon in an article about the co-option of popular musician Dick Lee 
to create music for the nation.
96
 In 1986 Dick Lee was speaking out against 
the Singapore government "trying to force culture upon the people",
97
 but by 
1994, he was performing in National Day celebrations.  
Oehlers also pointed to the export of music as a form of de-
politicisation. Using the example of gangsta-rap, he explained that when it is 
exported, it is "stripped of all its social and political content". As a result, 
when young Singaporeans mimic the music and appearance of the 
performers, "they remain totally oblivious to the origins of gangsta-rap, its 
message and values". He concluded that "far from acting as agents for social 
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and political change", it would seem that Singaporean youth are more likely 
to "be a force for the retention of the authoritarian status quo".
98
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From as early as 1972, the government of Singapore framed itself as a 
global city. In 1977, it articulated its global vision as public policy. 
Singapore's smallness propelled it, in Thomas Bellow's view, to engage 
globally from the 1960s.
99
 It did so with a rhetoric that emphasised youth, 
youngness and newness. Despite Singapore′s colonial heritage as a trading 
port and its history of international trading, globalisation has been 
constructed as synonymous with the new, young nation of Independent 
Singapore. That is, themes of newness and youth are linked to Singapore's 
globalised economy. Both have become key components of Singapore's 
nationalist rhetoric.  
In a typically adaptive style, the PAP turned the potential threat of 
globalisation to the nation-state into a source of nationalism. However, it is 
one that requires constant renegotiation and responsiveness.
100
 The flows of 
migration, in the form of temporary foreign workers, foreign talent, and 
permanent residents, when coupled with a high-tech urban environment, do 
reveal Singapore to be a global city. The movement of young 
"cosmopolitan" Singaporeans, for study and work, while being an integral 
part of the global city phenomena, also calls into question ideas of 
belonging and citizenship.
101
 The desire of the state to keep young 
Singaporeans connected to the nation necessitates the continuation of the 
rhetoric of fragility.  
The majority of Singaporeans were born after Independence, 
revealing the established nature of Singapore rather than its newness. While 
Singapore is not alone in stressing the role that young people will play in the 
future nation, the emphasis on a young nation makes the connection more 
obvious. However, the government's attitude towards Singapore's youth is 
contradictory. On the one hand, youth are represented as the potential of the 
future nation, while on the other, they are constructed as a threat to the 
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nation. Considerable attention is given to regulating and disciplining young 
Singaporeans so that they work towards national goals and not contrary 
goals. The significant role of young Singaporeans as consumers contributes 
to a rhetoric that emphasises the PAP's role in guiding the nation into         
the future. In consuming and competing, young Singaporeans are 
simultaneously doing what they "want" and what the PAP has constructed 
as necessary. An awareness of the Singapore narrative is further inculcated 
in them, which reinforces the legitimacy of the PAP. The link between 
competitiveness, conformity and consumerism is made clear in a poem by 
Alfran Sa'at: 
 
When I awoke I was twenty, being asked 
If I had a happy childhood. Yes, the one 
We all have: filled to the brim 
With the love of absent things.
102
 
 
Liberal Western observers tend to think a well-educated, economically 
comfortable, and technologically savvy population of young people will be 
inevitably drawn towards democratic values and individual freedom. The 
example of Singapore suggests that these commentators are incorrect.  
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